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Abstract—A basic model for key agreement with a remote
(or hidden) source is extended to a multi-user model with joint
secrecy and privacy constraints over all entities that do not
trust each other. Multiple entities using different measurements
of the same source through broadcast channels (BCs) to agree
on mutually-independent local secret keys are considered. Our
model is the proper multi-user extension of the basic model
since the encoder and decoder pairs are not assumed to trust
other pairs, unlike assumed in the literature. Strong secrecy
constraints imposed on all secret keys jointly, which is more
stringent than separate secrecy leakage constraints for each secret
key considered in the literature, are satisfied. Inner bounds for
maximum key rate, and minimum privacy-leakage and database-
storage rates are proposed for any finite number of entities.
Inner and outer bounds for degraded and less-noisy BCs are
given to illustrate cases with strong privacy. A multi-enrollment
model that is used for common physical unclonable functions is
considered to establish inner and outer bounds for key-leakage-
storage regions that differ only in the Markov chains imposed.
For this special case, the encoder and decoder measurement
channels have the same channel transition matrix and secrecy
leakage is measured for each secret key separately. We illustrate
cases for which it is useful to have multiple enrollments as
compared to a single enrollment and vice versa.
Index Terms—Information theoretic privacy, multiple enroll-
ments, multiple entities, physical unclonable functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
A natural source of randomness is biometric identifiers such
as fingerprints that are generally transformed into a frequency
domain and quantized to obtain bit sequences that are unique
to an individual [1]. Similarly, physical identifiers such as fine
variations of ring oscillator (RO) outputs or random start-
up values of static random access memories (SRAMs) that
are caused by uncontrollable manufacturing variations, are
safer and cheaper alternatives to key storage in a non-volatile
memory [2]. Physical identifiers for digital devices, such as
Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices, can be implemented using
physical unclonable functions (PUFs) [2]. One can use PUFs
in various coding schemes as a source of local randomness
[3, Chapter 1], e.g., in the randomized encoder of the wiretap
channel [4] and of the strong coordination problem [5], [6].
We use the basic source model for key agreement from
[7], [8] to find achievable rate regions for key agreement
with PUFs and biometric identifiers. In this classic model, an
encoder observes a source output to generate a secret key and
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sends public side information, i.e., helper data, to a decoder,
so the decoder can reliably reconstruct the same secret key by
observing another source output and the helper data. The main
constraints are that the information leaked about the secret
key, i.e., secrecy leakage, is negligible and the information
leaked about the identifier output, i.e., privacy leakage, is small
[9], [10]. Furthermore, the amount of storage should also be
minimized to limit the hardware cost [11].
Suppose the encoder generates a key from a noisy measure-
ment of a hidden (or remote) source output, and a decoder
has access to another noisy measurement of the same source
and the helper data to reconstruct the same key. We call this
model the generated-secret (GS) model with a hidden source.
This model is introduced in [12] as an extension of the visible
(noiseless) source outputs observed by the encoder, considered
in [9], [10]. Similarly, for the chosen-secret (CS) model, an
embedded (or chosen) key and noisy identifier measurements
are combined by the encoder to generate the public helper data.
We consider both models to address different applications.
A. Related Work and Motivation
The same identifier is used by multiple encoder and decoder
pairs in [13], where the identifier outputs observed by different
encoders are the same because the encoder measurements are
assumed to be noiseless. Therefore, the multiple use of the
same noiseless source output allows all encoders to know the
secret key of the other encoders. This model does not fit well to
the practical key agreement with identifiers scenarios because
there is noise in every identifier measurement.
Multiple enrollments of a hidden source using noisy mea-
surements are considered in [14], where weakly secure secret
keys are generated without privacy leakage and storage con-
straints. Furthermore, there is a causality assumption in [14] on
the availability of the helper data, i.e., any decoder has access
to all previously-generated helper data. This assumption is not
necessarily realistic as a decoder of, e.g., an IoT device that
embodies a PUF should be low complexity and the amount
of data to process increases linearly with the number of
enrollments. In addition, any manipulation in any of the helper
data can cause the complete multi-enrollment system to fail.
A classic method used for key agreement, i.e., the fuzzy
commitment scheme (FCS) [15], is used in [16] in combina-
tion with an SRAM PUF to enroll the noisy outputs of the
same SRAM multiple times. The symmetry condition in [16,
Eq. (16)] conditioned on a fixed SRAM cell state is entirely
similar to the symmetry satisfied by binary-input symmetric
output (BISO) channels; see e.g., [17, p. 613], [12, Eq. (14)].
For SRAM outputs that satisfy this symmetry, the normalized
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2(weak) secrecy leakage about each separate secret key is
shown to be zero. It is discussed in [18, Section 3.4] that
any uniformly-distributed hidden identifier output with BISO
measurement channels satisfies the results in [16]. In [18,
Theorem 1] the secret-key capacity of the two-enrollment key
agreement problem is established for measurement channels
with the same channel transition matrix. However, these multi-
enrollment models do not consider the privacy leakage and
storage constraints, there is no constraint on the independence
of the secret keys of different enrollments, and the secrecy
leakage constraint is weak and is not applied jointly on all se-
cret keys. Furthermore, optimal random linear code construc-
tions that achieve the boundaries of the key-leakage-storage
regions are given in [19], where the classic code constructions
FCS and code-offset fuzzy extractors [20] are shown to be
strictly suboptimal. Therefore, the multi-enrollment models
and constructions in the literature are strictly suboptimal and
not necessarily realistic. We therefore list stronger secrecy
constraints jointly on all entities, which approximates the re-
ality better in combination with storage rate and joint privacy-
leakage rate constraints. These constraints define the multi-
entity key agreement problem, where the entities that use the
same identifier do not have to trust other entities. Therefore,
the multi-entity key agreement problem is a proper multi-user
extension of single-enrollment models.
Every measurement of an identifier is considered to be
noisy due to, e.g., local temperature and voltage changes
in the hardware of the PUF circuit or a cut on the finger.
Noise components at the encoder and decoder measurements
of a hidden source can be also correlated due to, e.g., the
surrounding logic in the hardware [21] or constant fingertip
moisture. This correlation between the noise sequences is
modeled in [22] as a broadcast channel (BC) [23] with an
input that is the hidden source output and with outputs that
are the noisy encoder and decoder measurements. We use this
model for multi-entity key agreement with identifiers, where
each entity (i.e., each encoder and decoder pair) observes
noisy identifier outputs of the same hidden source through
different BCs. We allow the BCs to be different as trusted
entities generally use different hardware implementations of
the encoder and decoder pairs, which results in different
correlations between noise components.
We also consider physically-degraded (PD) and less-noisy
(LN) BCs to give finer inner and outer bounds to the key-
leakage-storage regions for the GS and CS models of the
multi-entity key agreement problem. For the considered PD
and LN BCs, we prove that strong privacy can be achieved.
In [9], [10], [24], an extra common randomness that is
available to the encoder and decoder and that is hidden from
the eavesdropper is required to obtain strong privacy. This
assumption is not realistic since such a common randomness
requires hardware protection against invasive attacks, and if
such a protection is feasible, then it is not necessary to use an
identifier for key agreement.
B. Models for Identifier Outputs
We study physical and biometric identifier outputs that are
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to a
given probability distribution. These models are reasonable if
one uses transform-coding algorithms from [25] that occupy a
small hardware area to extract almost i.i.d. bits from PUFs
under varying environmental conditions. Similar transform-
coding based algorithms have been applied to biometric
identifiers to obtain independent output symbols [26]. These
transform-coding algorithms provide almost i.i.d. identifier
outputs and noise sequences; however, the correlation between
the noise components on the encoder and decoder components
are not removed using these methods. Furthermore, PUFs are
used for on-demand key reconstruction and physical attacks
on PUFs permanently change the identifier outputs [27], so
we assume that the eavesdropper cannot obtain information
correlated with the PUF outputs, unlike biometric identifiers.
C. Summary of Contributions
We extend the key-leakage-storage rate tuple analysis of
the single-enrollment model for hidden identifier outputs mea-
sured through general BCs in [22] to consider multi-entity
key agreement with a set of stringent secrecy constraints. A
summary of the main contributions is as follows.
• We derive achievable key-leakage-storage rate tuples for
the GS model with strong secrecy for any finite number of
entities using the same identifier’s measurements through
different BCs for key agreement. Separate identifier mea-
surements considered in [12], [28] correspond to a PD BC
and the visible source model in [9], [10] corresponds to
a semi-deterministic BC.
• For a set of PD and LN BCs, the privacy-leakage rates
for the two-entity key agreement problem are calculated.
These PD and LN BCs are shown to provide strong
privacy without the need of a common randomness. An
outer bound is given for the considered PD and LN BCs.
• We consider a special case of the multi-enrollment key
agreement problem, where all measurement channels are
separate (i.e., PD BCs) and they have the same transition
matrix. This is a common model used for SRAM PUFs
[16]. Using a less stringent secrecy leakage constraint that
bounds the information leakage for each secret key sep-
arately and without the mutual independence constraint
on the secret keys, we establish inner and outer bounds
for the strong-secrecy key-leakage-storage region for this
two-enrollment key agreement problem. The bounds dif-
fer only in the Markov chains imposed. This result is
a significant improvement to the two-enrollment secret-
key rate region (without storage and privacy-leakage rate
constraints) established in [18] for weak secrecy, which
is recovered by eliminating auxiliary random variables in
the proposed rate regions.
• All inner and outer bounds for the GS model are extended
to the CS model, which comprises secret-key binding
methods that embed a chosen secret key to the encoder.
• We give two scenarios to compare single-enrollment and
two-enrollment models and illustrate that for different
assumptions on measurement channels, either of the two
models can perform better in terms of the privacy-leakage
vs. secret-key rate boundary tuples.
3D. Organization
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe
the multi-entity key agreement problem with BC measure-
ments. We give achievable key-leakage-storage regions for the
GS and CS models with strong secrecy and BC measurements
for any finite number of entities in Section III in addition
to inner and outer bounds for PD and LN BCs that satisfy
strong privacy. The proposed inner bounds for the two-entity
key agreement problem in Section IV are shown to differ
from the outer bounds only in the Markov chains imposed
for a special case with less stringent secrecy constraints. In
Sections V and VI, proofs of the given rate regions for the
general multi-entity key agremeent problem and for the two-
enrollment key agreement problem, respectively, are given.
Section VII concludes the paper.
E. Notation
Upper case letters represent random variables and lower
case letters their realizations. A superscript denotes a string of
variables, e.g., Xn=X1, X2, . . . , Xi, . . . , Xn, and a subscript
i denotes the position of a variable in a string. A random
variable X has probability distribution PX . Calligraphic letters
such as X denote sets, set sizes are written as |X | and their
complements as X c. [1 : J ] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , J}
for an integer J ≥ 1 and [1 : J ] \ {j} denotes the set
{1, 2, , . . . , j − 1, j + 1, . . . , J} for any j ∈ [1 : J ]. Hb(x) =
−x log x− (1− x) log(1− x) is the binary entropy function,
where we take logarithms to the base 2, and H−1b (·) denotes its
inverse with range [0, 0.5]. X ∼ Bern(α) is a binary random
variable with Pr[X = 1] = α. A binary symmetric channel
(BSC) with crossover probability p is denoted by BSC(p). Q(·)
is the Q-function that gives the tail probability for the standard
normal distribution.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITIONS
Consider hidden identifier outputs Xn that are i.i.d. ac-
cording to a probability distribution PX . If there are a finite
number J of trusted entities that use the same identifer, the j-th
encoder and decoder pair observes noisy source measurements
that are outputs of a BC PX˜jYj |X , with abuse of notation, for
j ∈ [1 : J ], where X˜j , Yj , and X are finite sets.
For the GS model shown in Fig. 1(a) for J = 2 trusted
entities, the j-th encoder fGS,j(·) generates helper data Wj
and a secret key Sj from X˜nj . All secret keys are stored in
a secure database, whereas helper data are stored in a public
database so that an eavesdropper has access only to the helper
data. Using the helper data Wj and the noisy measurements
Y nj , the j-th decoder gj(·, ·) generates the key estimate Sˆj .
Similar steps are applied for the CS model in Fig. 1(b) also for
J = 2 trusted entities, except that each Sj should be embedded
into the j-th encoder fCS,j(·, ·).
Denote a set of secret keys as
SK = {Sj : j ∈ K} (1)
and a set of helper data as
WK = {Wj : j ∈ K} (2)
PX
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the multi-entity key agremeent problem for J = 2
entities with encoder and decoder measurements through BCs for (a) the GS
model and (b) the CS model.
for any K ⊆ [1 : J ]. A (secret-key, privacy-leakage, storage),
or key-leakage-storage, rate tuple is denoted as (Rs, R`, Rw).
Similarly, we denote a set of secret-key rates, for any K ⊆
[1 : J ], as
Rs,K = {Rs,j : j ∈ K} (3)
and a set of storage rates as
Rw,K = {Rw,j : j ∈ K}. (4)
We next define the key-leakage-storage regions for the GS
and CS models.
Definition 1. A key-leakage-storage rate tuple
(Rs,[1:J], R`,Rw,[1:J]) is achievable for the GS and CS
models with j-th encoder and decoder measurements through
a BC PX˜jYj |X if, given any δ>0, there is some n≥1, and J
encoder and decoder pairs for which Rs,j =
log |Sj |
n
for all
j ∈ [1 : J ] and
Pr
 ⋃
j∈[1:J]
{Sj 6= Sˆj}
 ≤ δ (reliability) (5)
41
n
H(Sj) ≥ Rs,j − δ, ∀j∈ [1 : J ] (key uniformity) (6)
I (SK;SKc) ≤ δ, ∀K⊆ [1 : J ] (key ind.) (7)
1
n
I(Xn;W[1:J])≤R`+δ (privacy) (8)
I
(S[1:J];W[1:J]) ≤ δ (strong secrecy) (9)
1
n
log |Wj | ≤ Rw,j+δ, ∀j∈ [1 : J ] (storage). (10)
The key-leakage-storage regions Cgs for the GS model and
Ccs for the CS model are the closures of the set of all
achievable rate tuples (Rs,[1:J], R`,Rw,[1:J]).
Both secret-key uniformity (6) and storage rate (10) con-
straints correspond to J separate constraints. However, relia-
bility (5), strong and mutual key independence (7), privacy-
leakage rate (8), and secrecy leakage (9) constraints are joint
constraints for all J trusted entities.
The mutual key independence constraint in (7) is not im-
posed in the multi-enrollment key agreement problem consid-
ered in [16]. Furthermore, a normalized (weak) version of this
constraint is imposed in the multi-enrollment key agreement
problem considered in [14], where the j-th decoder gj(·, ·) is
assumed to have access to the set of helper data W[1:j] for
all j ∈ [1 : J ]. The lack of the mutual key independence
constraint and the assumption of availability of all previous
helper data require that different encoder and decoder pairs
should trust each other. This can be the case, e.g., if all
enrollments are made by the same entity. Therefore, the multi-
entity key agreement problem imposes strictly more stringent
constraints than the multi-enrollment key agreement problem.
The unnormalized secrecy leakage constraint (9) provides
strong secrecy, which is a stronger notion than the weak
secrecy considered in [9], [10], [12], [14], [16], [28]. Further-
more, (9) is more stringent than the set of individual secrecy
leakage constraints I(Sj ;W[1:J]) imposed for all j ∈ [1 : J ],
considered in [16] for symmetric SRAM PUF outputs in
combination with the suboptimal FCS.
The unnormalized privacy leakage I(Xn;W[1:J]) cannot be
bounded by a finite number in general. We illustrate special
strong privacy cases in the next section.
III. INNER BOUNDS
We are interested in characterizing the optimal trade-off
among the secret-key, privacy-leakage, and storage rates with
strong secrecy for BC measurements at the encoders and
decoders of any finite number J of entities that use the same
hidden identifier outputs. We give achievable rate regions for
the GS and CS models in Theorem 1. The proofs are given in
Section V.
Denote
UK = {Uj : j ∈ K} (11)
and define a function max{·, ·} that gives the maximum of the
input values as its output.
Theorem 1 (Inner Bounds for Multi-entity GS and CS Mod-
els). An achievable rate region Rgs for the GS model with J
entities is the union over all PUj |X˜j for all j ∈ [1 : J ] of the
rate tuples such that Rs,j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [1 : J ] and
Rs,j ≤ I(Uj ;Yj)− I(Uj ;U[1:J]\{j}), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (12)
R` ≥
J∑
j=1
max{0, I(Uj ;X)−I(Uj ;Yj)}, (13)
Rw,j≥I(Uj ; X˜j)− I(Uj ;Yj), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (14)
Rs,j +Rw,j ≤ H(Uj | U[1:J]\{j}), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ]. (15)
An achievable rate region Rcs for the CS model with J
entities is the union over all PUj |X˜j for all j ∈ [1 : J ] of the
rate tuples such that Rs,j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [1 : J ], (12), (13),
and
Rw,j≥I(Uj ; X˜j)− I(Uj ;U[1:J]\{j}), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (16)
Rw,j ≤ H(Uj | U[1:J]\{j}), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ]. (17)
For the achievable rate regions Rgs and Rcs, we have
PU[1:J]X˜[1:J]XY[1:J] = PX
J∏
j=1
PUj |X˜jPX˜jYj |X . (18)
Corollary 1. Suppose for all j ∈ [1 : J ] that
• X˜j−Yj−X form a Markov chain, i.e., X is a PD version
of Yj with respect to X˜j , or
• PXYj |X˜j is a LN BC with I(Uj ;Yj) ≥ I(Uj ;X) for all
PUj |X˜j .
For these cases, strong privacy, i.e.,
R` ≥ 0 (19)
can be achieved for the GS and CS models in combination
with the other corresponding bounds given in Theorem 1.
The proof of Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 1 because
I(Uj ;X) − I(Uj ;Yj) ≤ 0 for all j ∈ [1 : J ] for BCs
considered in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 illustrates that it is possible to obtain strong
privacy, i.e., negligible unnormalized privacy leakage, without
the requirement of a common randommness that is hidden
from an eavesdropper assumed in [9], [10], [24]. This is the
case because the observation Y nj of each decoder is “better”
than the observation X˜nj of the corresponding encoder with
respect to the hidden source Xn for all entities.
Remark 1. The rate regions for our problem depend on the
joint conditional probability distributions PXYj |X˜j rather than
only the marginal conditional distributions. Thus, the key-
leakage-storage regions for the stochastically-degraded BCs
are not necessarily equal to the regions for the corresponding
PD BCs, unlike in the classic BC problem. Furthermore, since
PX˜[1:J]XY[1:J] is fixed, the distinction between the LN BCs and
essentially-less noisy BCs [29], is not necessary.
We next give simple outer bounds for the key-leakage-
storage regions Cgs for the GS model and Ccs for the CS model
when the BCs PXYj |X˜j for all j ∈ [1 : J ] are PD BCs or LN
BCs as defined in Corollary 1. These simple outer bounds give
insights into the reason for different bounds on the secret-key
rates. Based on these insights, we show a special case in the
5next section with a less stringent secrecy constraint, for which
the inner and outer bounds differ only in the Markov chains
imposed and we illustrate that they match for simpler models.
Lemma 1. Suppose one of the cases given in Corollary 1 is
satisfied by the BCs PXYj |X˜j for all j ∈ [1 : J ]. An outer
bound on the key-leakage-storage region Cgs is the union over
all PUj |X˜j , where Uj − X˜j − (X,Yj) form a Markov chain,
for all j ∈ [1 : J ] of the rate tuples such that Rs,j ≥ 0 for all
j ∈ [1 : J ], (14), (19), and
Rs,j ≤ I(Uj ;Yj), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ]. (20)
An outer bound to the key-leakage-storage region Ccs for
the same BCs PXYj |X˜j is the union over all PUj |X˜j , where
Uj − X˜j − (X,Yj) form a Markov chain, for all j ∈ [1 : J ]
of the rate tuples such that Rs,j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [1 : J ], (19),
(20), and
Rw,j ≥ I(Uj ; X˜j), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ]. (21)
The proof of Lemma 1 follows straightforwadly by fol-
lowing the steps in [12, Section VI], defining the auxiliary
random variables Uj,i = (Sj ,Wj , Y i−1j ) for all j ∈ [1 : J ] and
i ∈ [1 : n], and by bounding I(Xn;W[1:J]) ≥ 0; therefore,
we omit the proof.
The outer bounds do not include the inequalities in (15) and
(17). Furthermore, the secret-key rate achieved by the inner
bound in (12) is smaller than the outer bound given in (20),
where the difference is the term −I(Uj ;U[1:J]\{j}). This term
is a result of the constraint in (44) that is imposed to satisfy the
strong and mutual key independence constraint given in (7).
Therefore, we next consider a model without the constraint in
(7) and use a secrecy-leakage constraint that is less stringent
than the one in (9), i.e., replace (9) by
I(Sj ;W[1:J]) ≤ δ, ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (22)
which is also a strong secrecy metric. Due to the lack
of a mutual key independence constraint, the model in the
next section is not a multi-entity model but rather a multi-
enrollment model. For a special case of this multi-enrollment
key agreement problem, we establish inner and outer bounds
for the key-leakage-storage regions that comprise the same
bounds but for different Markov chains.
IV. BOUNDS FOR A MULTI-ENROLLMENT MODEL
Consider J = 2 entities that measure the noisy outputs of
the same hidden source Xn through separate channels that
have the same channel transition matrices, i.e., for all j ∈ [1 :
2], x˜j ∈ X˜ , and yj ∈ X˜ we have
PX˜jYj |X(x˜j , yj |x) = PX˜|X(x˜j |x)PX˜|X(yj |x). (23)
This model is commonly used for, e.g., SRAM PUFs [30].
Using (23), we define a new multi-enrollment model.
Definition 2. A key-leakage-storage rate tuple
( sRs,1, sRs,2, sR`, sRw,1, sRw,2) is achievable for the GS and
CS models with measurements through a BC PX˜Y |X(x˜, y|x)
as in (23) if, given any δ > 0, there is some n ≥ 1, and
two encoder and decoder pairs for which sRs,1 = log |S1|
n
,sRs,2 = log |S2|
n
, sRw,1 = H(W1)
n
, sRw,2 = H(W2)
n
, and
Pr
[
{S1 6= Sˆ1}
⋃
{S2 6= Sˆ2}
]
≤ δ (reliability) (24)
1
n
H(Sj) = sRs,j − δ, j = 1, 2 (key uniformity) (25)
1
n
I(Xn;W1,W2)= sR`+δ (privacy) (26)
I (Sj ;W1,W2) ≤ δ, j = 1, 2 (strong secrecy) (27)
1
n
log |Wj | = sRw,j+δ, j = 1, 2 (storage) (28)
I(W1;W2) ≤ δ (storage ind.). (29)
The key-leakage-storage regions sCgs,J=2 for the GS model
and sCcs,J=2 for the CS model are the closures of the set of all
achievable rate tuples ( sRs,1, sRs,2, sR`, sRw,1, sRw,2).
We characterize in Theorem 2 inner and outer bounds for
key-leakage-storage regions sCgs,J=2 and sCcs,J=2. The proofs
of Theorem 2 are given in Section VI, where the reason for
the necessity of the secrecy-leakage constraint in (27) that is
less stringent than the joint secrecy-leakage constraint in (9)
is given in Remark 2. Similarly, the reason for the necessity
of the strong helper data (storage) independence constraint in
(29) is discussed in Remark 4.
Denote
j′ = 3− j, j = 1, 2. (30)
Theorem 2. (Inner Bounds): An achievable key-leakage-
storage region ĎRgs,J=2 is the union over all PU1|X˜1 and
PU2|X˜2 of the rate tuples such that
sRs,j ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2
and
sRs,j ≤ I(Uj ;Yj), j = 1, 2 (31)
sR` ≥ 2∑
j=1
(
I(Uj ;X)−I(Uj ;Yj)
)
, (32)
sR` ≤ 2∑
j=1
(
I(Uj ;X)−I(Uj ; X˜j)+ sRw,j), (33)
sRw,j≥I(Uj ; X˜j)− I(Uj ;Yj), j = 1, 2 (34)sRs,j + sRw,j ≤ H(Uj), j = 1, 2 (35)sRs,j + sRw,j + sRw,j′ ≤ H(Uj , Uj′), j = 1, 2. (36)
An achievable key-leakage-storage region ĎRcs,J=2 is the
union over all PU1|X˜1 and PU2|X˜2 of the rate tuples such thatsRs,j ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2, (31)-(33), and
sRw,j≥I(Uj ; X˜j), j = 1, 2 (37)sRw,j ≤ H(Uj), j = 1, 2 (38)sRw,j+ sRw,j′≤H(Uj , Uj′)+ sRs,j′ , j = 1, 2. (39)
For both achievable rate regions ĎRgs,J=2 and ĎRcs,J=2, we
6have
PU1U2X˜1X˜2XY1Y2(u1, u2, x˜1, x˜2, x, y1, y2)
= PU1|X˜1(u1|x˜1)PU2|X˜2(u2|x˜2)PX˜|X(x˜1|x)PX˜|X(x˜2|x)
× PX˜|X(y1|x)PX˜|X(y2|x)PX(x). (40)
(Outer Bounds) An outer bound for the key-leakage-storage
region sCgs,J=2 is the union over all PU1|X˜1 and PU2|X˜2 of the
rate tuples such that sRs,j ≥ 0, (31) - (36), and Uj − X˜j −
X − Yj form a Markov chain for j = 1, 2.
An outer bound for the key-leakage-storage region sCcs,J=2
is the union over all PU1|X˜1 and PU2|X˜2 of the rate tuples such
that sRs,j ≥ 0, (31) - (33), (37) - (39), and Uj − X˜j −X −Yj
form a Markov chain for j = 1, 2.
The inner and outer bounds differ because the outer bounds
define rate regions for the Markov chains U1 − X˜1 −X − Y1
and U2− X˜2−X −Y2, which are larger than the rate regions
defined by the inner bounds that satisfy (40). For instance, in
the achievability proof of Theorem 2, we apply the properties
of the Markov chain U2 − X˜2 − U1 in (87)(b), which does
not form a Markov chain for the choice of U1 and U2 in the
outer bounds. Therefore, inner and outer bounds do not match
in general.
Corollary 2. Choosing U1 = X˜1 and U2 = X˜2, it is straight-
forward to show that inner and outer bounds in Theorem 2
match if we do not impose any storage or privacy constraints,
i.e., impose only (24), (25), and (27). This result improves on
the secret-key capacity region given in [18, Theorem 1] for a
weak secrecy constraint.
Example 1. Consider the RO PUF model from [25, Section
4.1] where a transform-coding method is applied to conser-
vatively model the measurement channels PY |X = PX˜|X
as independent BSCs with the same crossover probability
of pA and where the hidden source output is Bern( 12 ). We
therefore can apply the achievability results from Theorem 2
to this RO PUF model. Using [12, Theorem 3] to evaluate the
boundary tuples of ĎRgs,J=2, it suffices to consider probability
distributions PUj |X˜j for j = 1, 2 such that PX˜j |Uj are BSCs
with crossover probabilities
x˜j =
H−1b (H(X|Uj))− pA
1− 2pA . (41)
Consider the projection of the boundary tuples ofĎRgs,J=2 onto
key-leakage plane, i.e., (31) and (32). We plot in Fig. 2 single-
enrollment results where the privacy-leakage rate is measured
with respect to single helper data and two-enrollment results
for the sum rate of the two keys, both for pA = 0.06 [25].
To achieve a total secret-key rate of I(X˜1;Y1) = I(X˜2;Y2),
the privacy-leakage rate for the two-enrollment model is
approximately 13.5% less than the privacy-leakage rate for
the single-enrollment model for RO PUFs. The reason for this
gain is the information bottleneck problem that arises from
(31) and (32) to find the boundary tuples.
Example 2. Consider uniform binary antipodal measurements
over an additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel.
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Fig. 2. Privacy-leakage vs. secret-key rate projection of the boundary tuples
of the single- and two-enrollment RO PUF models with BSCs(pA = 0.06).
Define the signal power as PS and the noise power as PN,
so we have a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of SNR =
PS
PN
. If
a matched filter, which maximizes the SNR at the sampling
instant for the AWGN channel, is applied at the encoder and
decoder, the bit error probability Pb is given by [31, pp. 96]
Pb = Q
(√
SNR
)
. (42)
The channel between the input binary symbols and the outputs
of the matched filter is a BISO channel. Using [12, Theorem
3], we have that PX˜j |Uj for j = 1, 2 that are BSCs with
crossover probabilities given in (41) by replacing pA with Pb,
suffice to obtain the boundary tuples of ĎRgs,J=2. We remark
that pA = 0.06 used in Example 1 corresponds to an SNR of
approximately 3.83dB.
In Fig. 3, the privacy-leakage rate vs. secret-key rate bound-
ary tuples are depicted for two cases. First, a two-enrollment
model at SNR = 3.83dB with a sum rate for secret keys is
depicted. For comparison, we plot a single-enrollment model
where the signal power Ps is doubled, i.e., we have an SNR
of approximately 6.84dB.
Fig. 3 shows for the two cases with the same total signal
power of 2Ps that the single enrollment boundary tuple can
result in a gain of approximately 228.55% at the corner point
in terms of the secret-key rates achieved for a given privacy-
leakage rate. For such an AWGN channel with a fixed total
signal power; therefore, the single-enrollment model can result
in significant gains in terms of achieved secret-key rates as
compared to the two-enrollment model for small sR` values.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We provide a proof that follows from the output statistics of
random binning (OSRB) method, proposed in [32] and further
extended in [33], by applying the steps in [34, Section 1.6].
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Fig. 3. Privacy-leakage vs. secret-key rate projection of the boundary tuples
of the single- and two-enrollment RO PUF models with different SNRs.
A. Proof for the GS Model
Proof Sketch: Fix PU1|X˜1 , PU2|X˜2 , . . . , PUJ |X˜J . Let
(Un[1:J], X˜n[1:J], Xn,Yn[1:J]) be i.i.d. according to (18). Assign
three random bin indices (Sj ,Wj , Cj) to each realization
unj for all j ∈ [1 : J ], where Sj represents the secret
key, Wj the helper data, and Cj a public index. Assume
Sj ∈ [1 : 2nRs,j ], Wj ∈ [1 : 2nRw,j ], and Cj ∈ [1 : 2nRc,j ]
such that Rs,j , Rw,j , Rc,j ≥ 0 for all j ∈ [1 : J ].
Apply the union bound to the reliability constraint in (5) to
obtain the sum of J error probabilities. This sum vanishes for
any finite number J when n → ∞ by using a Slepian-Wolf
(SW) [35] decoder to estimate Unj from (Cj ,Wj , Y
n
j ) if [32,
Lemma 1]
Rc,j +Rw,j > H(Uj |Yj), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ]. (43)
The key uniformity (6), mutual key independence (7), and
strong secrecy (9) constraints are satisfied if [32, Theorem 1]
Rs,j+Rw,j+Rc,j < H(Uj | U[1:J]\{j}), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (44)
since (44) ensures that the three random indices
(Sj ,Wj , Cj) are almost mutually independent and
uniformly distributed, and they are almost independent
of U[1:J]\{j}. Therefore, (Sj ,Wj , Cj) are almost independent
of
(S[1:J]\{j},W[1:J]\{j}, C[1:J]\{j}) because Unk determines
(Sk,Wk, Ck) for all k ∈ [1 : J ].
Similarly, the public randomness Cj is almost independent
of X˜nj , so it is almost independent of (X˜n[1:J], Xn,Yn[1:J]), if
we have [32, Theorem 1]
Rc,j < H(Uj |X˜j), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ]. (45)
Thus, the public indices C[1:J] can be fixed by generating them
uniformly at random. The j-th encoder can generate Unj ac-
cording to PUnj |X˜nj Cj obtained from the binning scheme above
to compute the bins (Sj ,Wj) from Unj for all j ∈ [1 : J ]. This
procedure induces a joint probability distribution that is almost
equal to PU[1:J]X˜[1:J]XY[1:J] fixed in (18) [34, Section 1.6].
Applying the Fourier Motzkin elimination [36] using the
software available in [37] to (43)-(45) for each j ∈ [1 : J ]
separately, we obtain the inequalities
Rw,j > I(Uj ; X˜j)− I(Uj ;Yj) (46)
Rs,j < I(Uj ;Yj)− I(Uj ;U[1:J]\{j}) (47)
Rw,j +Rs,j < H(Uj |U[1:J]\{j}) (48)
for all j ∈ [1 : J ].
To satisfy the constraints (46)-(48), we can fix the rates to
Rs,j = I(Uj ;Yj)−I(Uj ;U[1:J]\{j})−2, ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (49)
Rw,j = I(Uj ; X˜j)− I(Uj ;Yj) + 2, ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (50)
Rc,j = H(Uj |X˜j)− , ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (51)
for some  > 0 such that  → 0 when n → ∞. Furthermore,
using the selection lemma [38, Lemma 2.2], there exists a
binning that achieves all rate tuples given in (49)-(51).
Consider the privacy leakage for a binning that satisfies
(49)-(51). Since C[1:J] are public, we can bound the privacy
leakage as follows.
I(Xn;W[1:J], C[1:J])
(a)
≤ I(Xn;W[1:J]|C[1:J]) + Jn
≤ H(W[1:J])−H(W[1:J], C[1:J]|Xn) +H(C[1:J]) + Jn
(b)
= H(W[1:J])−
J∑
j=1
H(Wj , Cj |Xn) +H(C[1:J]) + Jn
≤
J∑
j=1
(
H(Wj)+H(Cj)−H(Wj , Cj |Xn)
)
+Jn (52)
where
(a) follows from the fact that Cj is almost independent of
(X˜n[1:J], Xn,Yn[1:J]) for all j ∈ [1 : J ] due to (45). Therefore,
Cj is almost independent of (Xn, C[1:J]\{j}) because Unk
determines Ck and Unk − X˜nk − X˜nj − Unj form a Markov
chain for all k 6= j and j, k ∈ [1 : J ], so we have
I(Xn; C[1:J])
= I(Xn;C1) + I(X
n;C2|C1) + . . .+ I(Xn;CJ |C[1:J−1])
≤ J.n (53)
for some n > 0 such that n → 0 when n→∞;
(b) follows because (Wj , Cj)−Xn−(W[1:j−1], C[1:j−1]) form
a Markov chain for all j ∈ [2 : J ].
Consider two cases for the privacy leakage analysis.
Case 1: Suppose for any j ∈ [1 : J ] that we have
Rc,j +Rw,j < H(Uj |X) (54)
i.e., H(Uj |X) > H(Uj |Yj), so (Wj , Cj , Xn) are almost
mutually independent [32, Theorem 1]. Therefore, we have
H(Wj)+H(Cj)−H(Wj , Cj |Xn)
≤ H(Wj)+H(Cj)−(H(Wj) +H(Cj)− ′n) = ′n (55)
for some ′n > 0 such that 
′
n → 0 when n→∞. Combining
(52) and (55) proves strong privacy.
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Rc,j +Rw,j ≥ H(Uj |X) (56)
i.e., H(Uj |X) ≤ H(Uj |Yj), so (Wj , Cj , Xn) can reliably
estimate Unj [32, Lemma 1]. Therefore, we have
H(Wj)+H(Cj)−H(Wj , Cj |Xn)
(a)
≤ H(Wj)+H(Cj)−nH(Uj |X) + n′′n
(b)
≤ n(I(Uj ;X)− I(Uj ;Yj) + + ′′n) (57)
where (a) follows because Unj determines (Wj , Cj),
(Wj , Cj , X
n) can realiably estimate Un for some ′′n > 0
such that ′′n → 0 when n→∞, and (Unj , Xn) are i.i.d., and
(b) follows by (50) and (51).
Combining (52) and (57), we obtain
I(Xn;W[1:J], C[1:J])− Jn
≤
J∑
j=1
j:
H(Uj |X)≤H(Uj |Yj)
n(I(Uj ;X)−I(Uj ;Yj)++′′n). (58)
These prove the achievability of the rate region Rgs.
B. Proof for the CS Model
We use the achievability proof for the GS model. Suppose
the key S′j , generated as in the GS model together with the
helper data W ′j and public index C
′
j , have the same cardinality
as the corresponding embedded secret key Sj , i.e., |S ′j | =
|Sj | for all j ∈ [1 : J ]. The chosen key Sj is uniformly
distributed and independent of (Xn, X˜n[1:J],Yn[1:J],S[1:J]\{j})
for all j ∈ [1 : J ]. Consider the j-th encoder fcs,j(·, ·) with
inputs (X˜nj , Sj) and output Wj = (S
′
j+Sj ,W
′
j), and the j-th
decoder gj(·, ·) with inputs (Y nj ,Wj) and output Sˆj = S′j +
Sj − Sˆ′j . All addition and subtraction operations are modulo-
|Sj | for all j ∈ [1 : J ]. The j-th decoder of the GS model is
used to obtain Sˆ′j for all j ∈ [1 : J ].
We have the error probability
Pr
 ⋃
j∈[1:J]
{Sj 6= Sˆj}
 = Pr
 ⋃
j∈[1:J]
{S′j 6= Sˆ′j}
 (59)
which is small due to the proof of achievability for the GS
model.
Using (49) and (50), and from the one-time padding oper-
ation applied above, we can achieve a storage rate of
Rw,j ≥ I(Uj ; X˜j)− I(Uj ;U[1:J]\{j}), ∀j ∈ [1 : J ] (60)
for the CS model.
We have the secrecy leakage of
I(S[1:J];W[1:J], C′[1:J])
(a)
= I(S[1:J];W[1:J]|C′[1:J])
=I(S[1:J];W ′[1:J]|C′[1:J])+I(S[1:J]; (S ′+S)[1:J]|W ′[1:J], C′[1:J])
(b)
= H((S ′+S)[1:J]|W ′[1:J], C′[1:J])−H(S ′[1:J]|W ′[1:J], C′[1:J])
(c)
≤ n
( J∑
j=1
Rs,j
)
−H(S ′[1:J]|C′[1:J]) + I(S ′[1:J];W ′[1:J]|C′[1:J])
(d)
≤ n
( J∑
j=1
Rs,j
)
−
(
n
( J∑
j=1
Rs,j
)
− ′′′n
)
+ I(S ′[1:J];W ′[1:J]|C′[1:J])
(e)
≤ ′′′n + (4)n (61)
where (a) follows since S[1:J] are chosen independently of
the public indices C[1:J], (b) follows because S[1:J] are chosen
independently of (W ′[1:J], C′[1:J],S ′[1:J]), (c) follows because
|S ′j | = |Sj | for all j ∈ [1 : J ], (d) follows because S ′[1:J] and
C′[1:J] are almost mutually independent and each S′j is almost
uniformly distributed due to (44) for some ′′′n > 0 such that
′′′n → 0 when n→∞, and (e) follows because the GS model
satisfies the strong secrecy constraint (9) due to (44) for some

(4)
n > 0 such that 
(4)
n → 0 when n→∞.
Using the selection lemma, there exists a binning that
achieves all rate tuples given in (49), (51), and (60). Consider
the privacy leakage for this binning.
I(Xn;W[1:J], C′[1:J])
(a)
≤ I(Xn;W[1:J]|C′[1:J]) + Jn
≤ I(Xn;W ′[1:J]|C′[1:J]) +H((S + S ′)[1:J]|W ′[1:J], C′[1:J])
−H((S + S ′)[1:J]|Xn,W ′[1:J], C′[1:J],S ′[1:J]) + Jn
(b)
≤ I(Xn;W ′[1:J]|C′[1:J])+
( J∑
j=1
log(|Sj |)
)
−H(S[1:J])+Jn
(c)
= I(Xn;W ′[1:J]|C′[1:J]) + Jn (62)
where (a) follows by (53), (b) follows because S[1:J] are
chosen independently of (Xn,W ′[1:J],S ′[1:J], C′[1:J]) and |S ′j | =
|Sj | for all j ∈ [1 : J ], and (c) follows from the uniformity
and mutual independence of S[1:J].
This proves the achievability of the rate region Rcs.
VI. PROOF OF THOREM 2
We use the OSRB method steps in [34, Section 1.6].
A. Achievability Proof for the GS Model
Fix
PU1|X˜1 = PU2|X˜2 = PU |X˜ . (63)
Let (Un1 , U
n
2 , X˜
n
1 , X˜
n
2 , X
n, Y n1 , Y
n
2 ) be i.i.d. according to
(40). Assign three random bin indices (Sj ,Wj , Cj) to each
realization unj for all j = 1, 2. Assume Sj ∈ [1 : 2nĎRs,j ],
Wj ∈ [1 : 2nĎRw,j ], and Cj ∈ [1 : 2nĎRc,j ] such thatsRs,j , sRw,j , sRc,j ≥ 0 for j = 1, 2.
Apply the union bound to the reliability constraint in (24),
which vanishes when n → ∞ by using an SW decoder to
estimate Unj from (Cj ,Wj , Y
n
j ) if [32, Lemma 1]sRc,j + sRw,j > H(Uj |Yj), j = 1, 2. (64)
9The key uniformity (25) constraint is satisfied if [32, The-
orem 1] sRs,j+ sRw,j+ sRc,j < H(Uj), j = 1, 2 (65)
since (65) ensures that the three random indices (Sj ,Wj , Cj)
are almost mutually independent and uniformly distributed.
Suppose a virtual joint encoder assigns six indices
(S1,W1, C1, S2,W2, C2) to each realization pair (un1 , u
n
2 ).
This virtual encoder is an operational dual of the virtual
decoder used in the proof of [18, Theorem 1]. Using the virtual
joint encoder, the strong secrecy constraint in (27) and the
strong helper data independence constraint in (29) are satisfied
if [32, Theorem 1]sRs,1+ sRw,1+ sRc,1+ sRw,2+ sRc,2 < H(U1, U2) (66)
and sRs,2+ sRw,2+ sRc,2+ sRw,1+ sRc,1 < H(U1, U2) (67)
because (66) ensures that (S1,W1, C1,W2, C2) are al-
most mutually independent; whereas, (67) ensures that
(S2,W2, C2,W1, C1) are almost mutually independent.
Remark 2. The set of equations considered in (65)-(67)
cannot be imposed for the joint secrecy-leakage constraint in
(9) for general probability distributions PX˜1X˜2XY1Y2 , since to
impose (9) one would replace (66) and (67) withsRs,1+ sRw,1+ sRc,1+ sRs,2 + sRw,2+ sRc,2 < H(U1, U2) (68)
which would also imply the mutual independence of secret
keys in (7). However, the inequalities in (65) and (68) cannot
be satisfied simultaneously in general as H(U1) + H(U2) ≥
H(U1, U2). This problem is avoided in the proof of Theorem 1
by imposing the inequality in (44) rather than (65).
The public randomness Cj is almost independent of X˜nj ,
so it is almost independent of (X˜n1 , X˜
n
2 , X
n, Y n1 , Y
n
2 ), if we
have [32, Theorem 1]sRc,j < H(Uj |X˜j), j = 1, 2. (69)
Thus, the public indices (C1, C2) can be fixed by generating
them uniformly at random. Unj can be generated according
to PUnj |X˜nj Cj for j = 1, 2 obtained from the binning scheme
above to compute the bins (Sj ,Wj) from Unj for j = 1, 2.
This procedure induces a joint probability distribution that is
almost equal to PU1U2X˜1X˜2XY1Y2 that is fixed in (40) [34,
Section 1.6].
Applying the Fourier Motzkin elimination to (64)-(67) and
(69), we obtain the inequalitiessRw,1 > H(U1|Y1)−H(U1|X˜1) (70)sRw,2 > H(U2|Y2)−H(U2|X˜2) (71)sRs,1 < I(U1;Y1) (72)sRs,2 < I(U2;Y2) (73)sRs,1 < −H(U1|Y1)−H(U2|Y2) +H(U1, U2) (74)sRs,2 < −H(U1|Y1)−H(U2|Y2) +H(U1, U2) (75)
sRs,1 + sRw,2 < −H(U1|Y1) +H(U1, U2) (76)sRs,1 + sRw,1 < H(U1) (77)sRs,1 + sRw,1 < −H(U2|Y2) +H(U1, U2) (78)sRs,1 + sRw,1 + sRw,2 < H(U1, U2) (79)sRs,2 + sRw,2 < −H(U1|Y1) +H(U1, U2) (80)sRs,2 + sRw,2 < H(U2) (81)sRs,2 + sRw,1 < −H(U2|Y2) +H(U1, U2) (82)sRs,2 + sRw,2 + sRw,1 < H(U1, U2). (83)
Observe that we have
H(U1|X˜2) = H(U1|Y1) = H(U2|X˜1) = H(U2|Y2) (84)
H(U1|X˜1) = H(U2|X˜2) (85)
H(U1) = H(U2) (86)
due to (23) and (63). We therefore obtain
H(U1, U2)−H(U1|Y1) (a)= H(U2)+H(U1|U2)−H(U1|X˜2)
(b)
≥ H(U2) (87)
where (a) follows by (84) and (b) follows from the Markov
chain U2−X˜2−U1. A similar result can be shown by swaping
the indices. Therefore, the constraints in (78) and (80) are
inactive due to the constraints, respectively, in (77) and (81) for
the two-enrollment model given in Definition 2. Similarly, the
constraints in (74) and (75) are inactive due to the constraints,
respectively, in (72) and (73).
Replace the inequalities in (76) and (82), respectively, with
2 sRs,1 + sRw,1 + sRw,2 < I(U1;Y1) +H(U1, U2) (88)
2 sRs,2 + sRw,2 + sRw,1 < I(U2;Y2) +H(U1, U2). (89)
Then, (88) is inactive because (72) and (79) imply (88), and
(89) is inactive because (73) and (83) imply (89). We remark
that rate region represented by (70)-(83) is the same as the
region represented by replacing (76) and (82) with (88) and
(89) because the corner points of the two rate regions are the
same. Therefore, the inequalities in (76) and (82) are inactive.
To satisfy the constraints (70)-(83), we can fix the rates tosRs,j = I(Uj ;Yj)−5, j = 1, 2 (90)sRw,j = I(Uj ; X˜j)− I(Uj ;Yj) + 2, j = 1, 2 (91)sRc,j = H(Uj |X˜j)− , j = 1, 2 (92)
for some  > 0 such that  → 0 when n → ∞ due to (84)-
(87). Furthermore, using the selection lemma, there exists a
binning that achieves all rate tuples given in (90)-(92).
Consider the privacy leakage for a binning that satisfies
(90)-(92). Since C1 and C2 are public, we can bound the
privacy leakage as follows.
I(Xn;W1,W2, C1, C2)
(a)
≤ I(Xn;W1,W2|C1, C2) + 2n
(b)
≤ H(W1,W2)−H(W1, C1|Xn)−H(W2, C2|Xn)
+H(C1, C2) + 2n
(c)
≤ H(W1) +H(W2)−H(Un1 |Xn)−H(Un2 |Xn) + 2n′′n
+H(C1) +H(C2) + 2n (93)
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(d)
≤ n(I(U1;X)− I(U1;Y1) + I(U2;X)− I(U2;Y2))
+ 2n′′n + 2n+ 2n (94)
where (a) follows by (53) for J = 2, (b) follows because
(W1, C1)−Xn− (W2, C2) form a Markov chain, (c) follows
for some ′′n > 0 such that 
′′
n → 0 when n→∞ because for
the two-enrollment model considered, (56) is satisfied due to
the Markov chain Uj −X − Yj for j = 1, 2, and (d) follows
by (91) and (92), and because (Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n) are i.i.d.
Using (93) for general rate tuples that satisfy the constraints
(70)-(83), i.e., not only (90)-(92), we can bound the privacy
leakage as
I(Xn;W1,W2, C1, C2)
(a)
≤ n sRw,1 + n sRw,2 + nI(U1;X)− nI(U1; X˜1)
+ nI(U2;X)− nI(U2; X˜2) + 2n′′n + 2n (95)
where (a) follows by (92) and because (Un1 , U
n
2 , X
n) are i.i.d.
These prove the achievability of the key-leakage-storage
region ĎRgs,J=2.
B. Achievability Proof for the CS Model
The achievability proof for the CS model follows by apply-
ing the one-time padding step used in Section V-B.
C. Outer Bound Proofs for the GS and CS Models
Suppose for some δn>0 and n, there is a pair of encoders
and decoders such that (24)-(29) are satisfied by some key-
leakage-storage tuple ( sRs,1, sRs,2, sR`, sRw,1, sRw,2). Using (24)
and Fano’s inequality, we obtain
H(Sj |Wj , Y nj )
(a)
≤ H(Sj |Sˆj)≤nn, j = 1, 2 (96)
where (a) permits randomized decoding, n =
δnmax{ sRs,1, sRs,2}+Hb(δn)/n such that n→0 if δn→0.
Let Uj,i , (Sj ,Wj , Xi−1), which satisfies the Markov
chain Uj,i − X˜j,i −Xi − Yj,i for all i ∈ [1 : n] and j = 1, 2.
Remark 3. For the choice of Uj,i = (Sj ,Wj , Xi−1) (and
similarly for Uj,i = (Sj ,Wj , Y i−1j )) for j=1, 2, U1,i−X˜1,i−
U2,i do not form a Markov chain for all i ∈ [1 : n] although
for the inner bound we use this Markov chain. This is the
reason why inner and outer bounds do not match in general.
Proof for (31): We obtain for the GS and CS models for
j = 1, 2 that
n( sRs,j − δn) (a)≤ H(Sj)−H(Sj |Wj , Y nj ) + nn
(b)
≤ I(Sj ;Y nj |Wj) + nn + δn
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Sj ,Wj , Y
i−1
j ;Yj,i) + n +
δn
n
]
(c)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
I(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1;Yj,i) + n +
δn
n
]
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uj,i;Yj,i) + n +
δn
n
]
(97)
(a) follows by (25) and (96), (b) follows by (27), (c) follows
by applying the data-processing inequality to the Markov chain
Y i−1j − (Wj , Sj , Xi−1)− Yj,i, j = 1, 2, ∀i ∈ [1 :n] (98)
and (d) follows from the definition of Uj,i.
Proof for (32): We have for the GS and CS models that
n( sR` + δn) (a)= H(W1,W2)−H(W1|Xn)−H(W2|Xn)
(b)
= H(W1|Y n1 )−H(W1|Xn) +H(W2|Y n2 )−H(W2|Xn)
+ I(W1; X˜
n
2 ) + I(W2;Y
n
2 )− I(W1;W2)
(c)
≥
2∑
j=1
[
H(Wj |Y nj )−H(Wj |Xn)
]
≥
2∑
j=1
[
H(Sj ,Wj , Y
n
j )−H(Sj |Wj , Y nj )−H(Y nj )
−H(Sj ,Wj |Xn)
]
(d)
≥
2∑
j=1
[
I(Sj ,Wj ;X
n)− I(Sj ,Wj ;Y nj )− nn
]
(e)
≥
2∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1;Xi)−I(Sj ,Wj , Xi−1;Yj,i)−n
]
(f)
=
2∑
j=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uj,i;Xi)− I(Uj,i;Yj,i)− n
]
(99)
where (a) follows by (26) and from the Markov chain W1 −
Xn −W2, (b) follows because I(W1;Y n1 ) = I(W1; X˜n2 ) due
to (23), (c) follows from the Markov chain W1−X˜n2 −W2, (d)
follows by (96), (e) follows because the channel and source
are memoryless and from the Markov chain in (98), and (f)
follows from the definition of Uj,i.
Proof for (33): We have for the GS and CS models that
n( sR` + δn)
(a)
≤ H(W1) +H(W2)−H(W1|Xn)−H(W2|Xn)
(b)
≤
2∑
j=1
[
n sRw,j +H(Sj ,Wj |X˜nj )−H(Sj ,Wj |Xn) + nn]
(c)
=
2∑
j=1
[
n sRw,j + n∑
i=1
I(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1;Xi)
−
n∑
i=1
I(Sj ,Wj , X˜
i−1
j ; X˜j,i) + nn
]
(d)
≤
2∑
j=1
[
n sRw,j + n∑
i=1
I(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1;Xi)
−
n∑
i=1
I(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1; X˜j,i) + nn
]
(e)
≤
2∑
j=1
[
n sRw,j + n∑
i=1
(I(Uj,i;Xi)− I(Uj,i; X˜j,i))
+ nn
]
(100)
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where (a) follows by (26) and from the Markov chain W1 −
Xn−W2, (b) follows by (96) and from the Markov chain Sj−
(Wj , X
n)− Y n for j = 1, 2, (c) follows because the channel
and source are memoryless, (d) follows from the Markov chain
Xi−1−(Wj , Sj , X˜i−1j )−X˜j,i, j = 1, 2, ∀i ∈ [1 :n] (101)
and (e) follows from the definition of Uj,i.
Proof for (34): Observe for the GS model for j = 1, 2 that
n( sRw,j + δn) (a)≥ H(Wj |Y nj ) + I(Wj ;Y nj )
(b)
≥ H(Sj ,Wj , Y nj )−H(Y nj )−H(Sj |Wj , Y nj )
−H(Sj ,Wj |X˜nj ) + I(Wj ;Y nj )
(c)
≥ I(Sj ,Wj ; X˜nj )− I(Sj ,Wj ;Y nj )− nn
(d)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Sj ,Wj , X˜
i−1
j ; X˜j,i)−I(Sj ,Wj , Y i−1j ;Yj,i)−nn]
(e)
≥
n∑
i=1
[I(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1; X˜j,i)−I(Sj ,Wj , Xi−1;Yj,i)−nn]
(f)
=
n∑
i=1
[I(Uj,i; X˜j,i)−I(Uj,i;Yj,i)−nn] (102)
where (a) follows by (28), (b) follows from the encoding
steps, (c) follows by (96), (d) follows because the source and
channel are memoryless, (e) follows from the data-processing
inequality applied to the Markov chains in (98) and (101), and
(f) follows from the definition of Uj,i.
Proof for (37): Observe for the CS model for j = 1, 2 that
n( sRw,j+δn) (a)≥ I(Sj ,Wj ; X˜nj )−H(Sj |Wj)+H(Sj ,Wj |X˜nj )
(b)
≥ I(Sj ,Wj ; X˜nj ) + I(Sj ;Wj)
(c)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Sj ,Wj , X˜
i−1
j ; X˜j,i)
(d)
≥
n∑
i=1
I(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1; X˜j,i)
(e)
=
n∑
i=1
I(Uj,i; X˜j,i) (103)
where (a) follows by (28), (b) follows because X˜n is indepen-
dent of Sj and from the encoding step, (c) follows because the
source and channel are memoryless, (d) follows by applying
the data-processing inequality to the Markov chain in (101),
and (e) follows from the definition of Uj,i.
Proof for (35): We have for the GS model for j = 1, 2 that
n( sRs,j + sRw,j) (a)= H(Sj ,Wj) + I(Sj ;Wj) + nδn
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1) +
δn
n
+ δn
]
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Uj,i) +
δn
n
+ δn
]
(104)
where (a) follows by (25), (b) follows by (27), and (c) follows
from the definition of Uj,i.
Proof for (38): Similarly, we have for the CS model for
j = 1, 2 that
n sRw,j ≤ n∑
i=1
H(Sj ,Wj , X
i−1)
(a)
=
n∑
i=1
H(Uj,i) (105)
where (a) follows from the definition of Uj,i.
Proof for (36): We obtain for the GS model for j = 1, 2
and j′ as defined in (30) that
n( sRs,j + sRw,j + sRw,j′)
(a)
= H(Sj ,Wj ,Wj′) + I(Sj ;Wj ,Wj′) + I(Wj ;Wj′) + nδn
(b)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Sj ,Wj ,Wj′ , Sj′ , X
i−1) +
2δn
n
+ δn
]
(106)
(c)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Uj,i, Uj′,i) +
2δn
n
+ δn
]
(107)
where (a) follows by (25), (b) follows by (27) and (29), and
(c) follows from the definitions of Uj,i and Uj′,i.
Proof for (39): We have for the CS model for j = 1, 2 and
j′ as defined in (30) that
n( sRw,j+ sRw,j′)
≤
n∑
i=1
H(Wj ,Wj′ , Sj , Sj′ , X
i−1) + I(Wj ;Wj′) + n sRs,j′
(a)
≤
n∑
i=1
[
H(Wj ,Wj′ , Sj , Sj′ , X
i−1) +
δn
n
+ sRs,j′] (108)
(b)
=
n∑
i=1
[
H(Uj,i, Uj′,i) +
δn
n
+ sRs,j′] (109)
where (a) follows by (29) and (b) follows from the definitions
of Uj,i and Uj′,i.
Remark 4. (106) and (108) are the only places we use the
strong helper data independence constraint in (29) and it does
not seem straightforward to obtain the inequalities in (106)
and (108) without (29).
Introduce a uniformly distributed time-sharing random vari-
able Q ∼ Unif[1 : n] independent of other random variables.
Define X=XQ, X˜j=X˜j,Q, Y =Yj,Q, and Uj=(Uj,Q,Q) so
that Uj−X˜j−X−Yj form a Markov chain for j = 1, 2. The
outer bound for the GS model follows by using the introduced
random variables in (97), (99), (100), (102), (104), and (107),
and letting δn → 0. Similarly, the outer bound for the CS
model follows by using the introduced random variables in
(97), (99), (100), (103), (105), and (109), and letting δn → 0.
VII. CONCLUSION
We derived inner bounds for the multi-entity key-leakage-
storage regions for GS and CS models with strong secrecy,
a hidden identifier source, and correlated noise components
at the encoder and decoder measurements that are modeled
as BCs. The inner bounds are valid for any finite number
of entities that use the same hidden source to agree on a
secret key. We argued that the mutual key independence
constraint we impose makes the proposed multi-entity key
12
agreement problem a proper multi-user extension of the classic
single-enrollment key agreement problem, unlike the multi-
enrollment key agreement problem considered in the literature.
A set of degraded and less-noisy BCs was shown to provide
strong privacy without a need for a common randomness.
We established inner and outer bounds for the key-lekage-
storage regions for a two-enrollment model with measurement
channels that are valid for SRAM and RO PUFs. Inner and
outer bounds were shown to differ only in the Markov chains
imposed and they match if the storage and privacy-leakage
rate constraints are removed. Two examples illustrated that
depending on the constraints of the practical scenario, single
or multiple enrollment might perform better in terms of the
secret-key vs. privacy-leakage rate ratio. In future work, we
will find a set of probability distributions for which the strong
helper data independence constraint in the two-enrollment
model can be eliminated.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
O. Gu¨nlu¨ thanks Rafael F. Schaefer for fruitful discussions.
REFERENCES
[1] P. Campisi, Security and Privacy in Biometrics. London, U.K.:
Springer-Verlag, 2013.
[2] B. Gassend, “Physical random functions,” Master’s thesis, M.I.T., Cam-
bridge, MA, Jan. 2003.
[3] O. Gu¨nlu¨, “Key agreement with physical unclonable functions and
biometric identifiers,” Ph.D. dissertation, TU Munich, Germany, Nov.
2018, published by Dr. Hut Verlag.
[4] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Labs Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355–1387, Oct. 1975.
[5] P. W. Cuff, H. H. Permuter, and T. M. Cover, “Coordination capacity,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 4181–4206, Sep. 2010.
[6] G. Cervia, L. Luzzi, M. L. Treust, and M. R. Bloch, “Strong coordi-
nation of signals and actions over noisy channels with two-sided state
information,” Mar. 2018, [Online]. Available: arxiv.org/abs/1801.10543.
[7] R. Ahlswede and I. Csisza´r, “Common randomness in information theory
and cryptography - Part I: Secret sharing,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory,
vol. 39, no. 4, pp. 1121–1132, July 1993.
[8] U. M. Maurer, “Secret key agreement by public discussion from common
information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 2733–742, May
1993.
[9] T. Ignatenko and F. M. J. Willems, “Biometric systems: Privacy and
secrecy aspects,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 4, no. 4, pp.
956–973, Dec. 2009.
[10] L. Lai, S.-W. Ho, and H. V. Poor, “Privacy-security trade-offs in
biometric security systems - Part I: Single use case,” IEEE Trans. Inf.
Forensics Security, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 122–139, Mar. 2011.
[11] I. Csisza´r and P. Narayan, “Common randomness and secret key
generation with a helper,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 46, no. 2, pp.
344–366, Mar. 2000.
[12] O. Gu¨nlu¨ and G. Kramer, “Privacy, secrecy, and storage with multiple
noisy measurements of identifiers,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security,
vol. 13, no. 11, pp. 2872–2883, Nov. 2018.
[13] L. Lai, S. Ho, and H. V. Poor, “Privacy–security trade-offs in biometric
security systems - Part II: Multiple use case,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 140–151, Mar. 2011.
[14] L. Kusters and F. M. J. Willems, “Secret-key capacity regions for
multiple enrollments with an SRAM-PUF,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics
Security, vol. 14, no. 9, pp. 2276–2287, Sep. 2019.
[15] A. Juels and M. Wattenberg, “A fuzzy commitment scheme,” in ACM
Conf. Comp. Commun. Security, New York, NY, Nov. 1999, pp. 28–36.
[16] L. Kusters, T. Ignatenko, F. M. J. Willems, R. Maes, E. van der Sluis,
and G. Selimis, “Security of helper data schemes for SRAM-PUF in
multiple enrollment scenarios,” in IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory, Aachen,
Germany, June 2017, pp. 1803–1807.
[17] I. Land, S. Huettinger, P. A. Hoeher, and J. B. Huber, “Bounds on
information combining,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 51, no. 2, pp.
612–619, Feb. 2005.
[18] L. Kusters, O. Gu¨nlu¨, and F. M. Willems, “Zero secrecy leakage for
multiple enrollments of physical unclonable functions,” in Symp. Inf.
Theory Sign. Process. Benelux, Twente, The Netherlands, May-June
2018, pp. 119–127.
[19] O. Gu¨nlu¨, O. Iscan, V. Sidorenko, and G. Kramer, “Code constructions
for physical unclonable functions and biometric secrecy systems,” IEEE
Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 14, no. 11, pp. 2848–2858, Nov.
2019.
[20] Y. Dodis, R. Ostrovsky, L. Reyzin, and A. Smith, “Fuzzy extractors:
How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data,”
SIAM J. Comput., vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 97–139, Jan. 2008.
[21] D. Merli, F. Stumpf, and C. Eckert, “Improving the quality of ring
oscillator PUFs on FPGAs,” in ACM Workshop Embedded Sys. Security,
New York, NY, Oct. 2010, pp. 9:1–9:9.
[22] O. Gu¨nlu¨, R. F. Schaefer, and G. Kramer, “Private authentication with
physical identifiers through broadcast channel measurements,” in IEEE
Inf. Theory Workshop, Visby, Sweden, Aug. 2019.
[23] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of Information Theory, 2nd ed.
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2012.
[24] R. A. Chou, M. R. Bloch, and E. Abbe, “Polar coding for secret-key
generation,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 61, no. 11, pp. 6213–6237,
Nov. 2015.
[25] O. Gu¨nlu¨, T. Kernetzky, O. I˙s¸can, V. Sidorenko, G. Kramer, and R. F.
Schaefer, “Secure and reliable key agreement with physical unclonable
functions,” Entropy, vol. 20, no. 5, May 2018.
[26] J. Wayman, A. Jain, D. Maltoni, and D. M. (Eds), Biometric Systems:
Technology, Design and Performance Evaluation. London, U.K.:
Springer-Verlag, 2005.
[27] R. Pappu, “Physical one-way functions,” Ph.D. dissertation, M.I.T.,
Cambridge, MA, Oct. 2001.
[28] O. Gu¨nlu¨, K. Kittichokechai, R. F. Schaefer, and G. Caire, “Controllable
identifier measurements for private authentication with secret keys,”
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Security, vol. 13, no. 8, pp. 1945–1959, Aug.
2018.
[29] C. Nair, “Capacity regions of two new classes of two-receiver broadcast
channels,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 56, no. 9, pp. 4207–4214, Sep.
2010.
[30] R. Maes, P. Tuyls, and I. Verbauwhede, “A soft decision helper data
algorithm for SRAM PUFs,” in IEEE Int. Symp. Inf. Theory, Seoul,
South Korea, June 2009, pp. 2101–2105.
[31] J. Hagenauer, “Lecture Notes in Digital Communications 1,” G. Kramer
and O. Gu¨nlu¨, Eds. Singapore: TU Munich Asia, Feb. 2019.
[32] M. H. Yassaee, M. R. Aref, and A. Gohari, “Achievability proof via
output statistics of random binning,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 60,
no. 11, pp. 6760–6786, Nov. 2014.
[33] M. Nafea and A. Yener, “A new wiretap channel model and its strong
secrecy capacity,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 64, no. 3, pp. 2077–
2092, Mar. 2018.
[34] M. Bloch, Lecture Notes in Information-Theoretic Security. Atlanta,
GA: Georgia Inst. Technol., July 2018.
[35] D. Slepian and J. Wolf, “Noiseless coding of correlated information
sources,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 19, no. 4, pp. 471–480, July
1973.
[36] A. Schrijver, Theory of Linear and Integer Programming. Chichester,
England: John Wiley & Sons, June 1998.
[37] I. B. Gattegno, Z. Goldfeld, and H. H. Permuter, “Fourier-Motzkin
elimination software for information theoretic inequalities,” 2016.
[38] M. Bloch and J. Barros, Physical-layer Security. Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Uni. Press, 2011.
